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  The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Commodity Credit Corporation 
(CCC) spent an estimated $20.1 billion towards agricultural support programs in 2005 (USDA, CCC, 
2006), which represents approximately 7.4% of the $270 billion value of agricultural production in 
that same year (USDA, ERS, 2005).  This system of cash payments serves as both an income 
enhancement regardless of commodity prices and a safety net for farmers when prices are below 
specified levels.  Therefore, when commodity prices are low, government payments can represent a 
significant portion of a farm’s gross cash income, minimizing their exposure to downside financial 
risks.  A reduction in these payments may affect the incomes, wealth, and financial risks for 
producers of different size, leverage position, and other characteristics differently. Thus, potential 
changes to farm policy may affect farm structure and it is important to recognize the implications of 
policy alternatives for different types of farms. 
  The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act, passed by the United States Congress in 2002, 
governs current farm subsidy programs.  The three primary types of subsidies as part of the FSRI 
include the following: direct payments, countercyclical payments, and loan deficiency payments.  
Direct payments (DPs) are fixed and decoupled from production decisions.  They are paid using base 
acres and program yields and are determined from historical records and a fixed government 
payment rate.  Thus, DPs are calculated irrespective of present year planted acreage, yield, and price. 
Countercyclical payments (CCPs) are based on historical production records, making 
individual farmer production decisions in the present year unrelated to CCP amounts. However, 
unlike DPs, CCPs are calculated from current marketing year average (MYA) prices.  Therefore, US 
farmer production decisions in aggregate can affect MYA prices which can affect subsidy levels.  
Under present legislation, CCPs are issued at a set maximum rate whenever commodity prices fall 
below a national loan rate.  As MYA prices rise above that loan rate, CCP rates linearly decline until 
they diminish to zero.  Therefore, since CCPs are linked inversely to MYA prices, these payments act 
as a safety net when prices are low.   Loan deficiency payments (LDPs) are government issued loans utilizing farmers’ crop as 
collateral against the loan (ERS, 2006).  If the government-specified posted county price (PCP) drops 
below the national loan rate, farmers are required to pay the loan back at the PCP, effectively setting 
a price floor at the national loan rate.  If the PCP is above the national loan rate, no subsidies exist.  
Loans are issued based on present year planted acres and yields and are linked with current 
production decisions.  Farmers can also receive these payments regardless of whether loans were 
taken out or not.  Thus, government subsidies can have larger impacts than DPs and CCPs on 
current production decisions. 
Aggregate US commodity subsidy payments—including DPs, CCPs, and LDPs—are 
restricted by the 149-country World Trade Organization (WTO), of which the US is a member.  The 
WTO oversees international trade policies between countries while “ensuring that trade flows as 
smoothly, predictably and freely as possible.” (WTO, 2006).  The implementation of this goal 
includes restricting trade-distorting domestic policies, which directly relate subsidy levels to volumes 
of production (UIUC, Farmdoc, 2006).   
The WTO monitors domestic support by categorizing specific subsidy programs into one of 
the following colored boxes based upon their level of trade distortion: green, blue, or amber.  Green 
box programs are not trade distorting and are not directly linked to current production levels.  The 
WTO has no limit restrictions on total green box programs payments (WTO, 2006).  Blue box 
programs are more trade distorting than green box programs and are directly linked to current 
production levels. However, production limits are built into the design of blue box programs (WTO, 
2006).  Amber box programs are the most trade distorting and are directly linked to current 
production.  The WTO presently places limits on amber box policies (WTO, 2006). 
The current Doha round of WTO negotiations calls for the reduction of trade-distorting 
policies in the US to promote compliance with WTO guidelines.  Under current assumptions, green 
box payments include DPs and will not be directly limited or reduced through this round (FAPRI, 
CARD, 2005, p.4).  However, reductions in blue box programs, which include CCPs, and amber box programs, which include LDPs, must occur in order to make aggregate measures of support (AMS) 
compliant with WTO agreements (Hart and Beghin, 2004, p.10).  With the 2002 US Farm Security 
and Rural Investment Act expiring in 2007, a reduction in national loan rates and target prices 
appears likely in the upcoming Farm Bill to ensure WTO compliance. 
If a reduction in loan rates and target prices is realized in the next farm bill, the effects could 
be highly uneven on different US farms, as the current agricultural subsidies are asymmetrically 
distributed between varying farm sizes.  For example, in 2004, approximately 40% of farms received 
government payments. The average subsidy amount awarded to recipient farmers was approximately 
$12,000, which represents 5% of the gross cash income for the respective farm.  However, despite 
only representing 10% of the total number of farms in the U.S., over 50% of all government 
payments in 2004 were received by large commercial farms (as defined by the Economic Research 
Service) (USDA, ERS, 2006).  On average, recipient commercial farms garnered approximately 
$37,000 of subsidies per farm, which represents approximately 6% of their gross cash income.  The 
average payment awarded to a recipient rural residence farm was approximately $3,700, representing 
16% of their gross cash income (USDA, ERS, 2006).  Thus, despite large commercial farms receiving 
a greater proportion of government subsidies, their dependence upon farm subsidies is substantially 
less than smaller, rural residence farms.   
Reductions in government payments could also have varying impacts on income and wealth 
levels depending on a farm’s land tenure system.  Research by Kirwan (2003), Goodwin, et al. (2003), 
and Lence and Mishra (2003) shows empirical evidence that government payments are often 
capitalized into higher land values and cash rents.  Thus, a decrease in government subsidies would 
be partially offset by a reduction in per acre cash rents for farms renting a high percentage of 
farmland.  Additionally, a reduction in government subsidies could equate to a loss of farmland value 
and owner’s equity for farms that own a high percentage of their land.  The impact on producers 
could be highly variable considering approximately 60% of the farmland in the US is rented (USDA, 
ERS, 2003).   A decrease in downside price protection by a reduction in subsidy payments could equate to 
greater financial stress and a higher probability of loan defaults by highly-leveraged producers. For 
example, while having a high owned-to-operated ratio means that a farm leases a low percentage of 
their land, a high owned-to-operated ratio does not mean that “owned” land is free-and-clear of debt 
obligations.  The average debt-to-asset ratio of all farms in the US in 2004 was 13.8% (ERS, AO, 
2006).  However, according to the 2004 Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS), only 
35% of US farms were carrying this entire debt load.  This implies that there is substantial variation 
in the debt obligations across US farms.  In times of low commodity prices, government subsidy 
payments may represent a large safety net for highly-leveraged producers when attempting to service 
those debt obligations.   
The overall problem is a reduction in government payments causes the risk of serious 
negative impacts on annual farm income, total equity, and debt repayment capacity.  The objective of 
this research is to determine the financial impacts of reduced government payments on farms.  The 
research will consider the affect a reduction of government payments has on farms that differ in 
typology, land tenure system, and capital structure.  A quantification of these effects could assist 
farmers and inform policymakers with preparing for potential financial and sociological disasters 
arising from reductions in payments. 
Methodology 
A stochastic simulation model is used to carry out the objective of this research.  The model 
will captures a distribution of 1,000 possible outcomes of yield and price for corn, soybeans, and 
wheat each year over a 10-year horizon.  These observations are subsequently input into a farm 
accounting model that will track net farm income, and other key ratios such as return on equity, debt-
to-asset ratio, and debt coverage ratio.  The mean and volatility of these simulations will be analyzed, 
providing particular insight when prices drop to low levels and high subsidy payments act as a safety 
net.  Reductions in subsidy payments follow an analysis conducted by the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) in order to meet WTO commitments.  This involves a linear 
reduction in target prices and loan rates over a 5-year period from 2008 to 2012. 
Farm balance sheets, cash flow statements, and income statements are calibrated from the 
2003 Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) to reflect typical Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio 
corn, soybean, and wheat farms.  Three separate typologies, or categorizations of farm types, are 
analyzed: farm operator with spouse working off farm, traditional, and commercial.  High and low 
debt scenarios and high and low land ownership scenarios will be analyzed with each of the 3 
typologies.  Thus, there are 12 farm types analyzed in total.   
Revenues on the income statement incorporate simulated cash receipts, commodity 
payments, and crop insurance indemnity payments as well as non-simulated, scenario-specific other 
farm and non-farm income.  Operating expense estimates for each scenario are adjusted annually for 
inflation by baseline projections from FAPRI.  Fixed expenses including interest and depreciation are 
calculated using beginning asset and debt values.  Beginning cash rent costs for land are changed on a 
year-over-year basis by a proportion of the percentage change in expected year-over-year returns to 
land. 
Net farm income is combined with taxes, debt service, and operator withdrawals to 
determine cash flow impacts for the farm.  Taxes are assumed to be for a sole proprietor farming 
operation and federal taxes are filed as “Head of Household”.  State taxes follow Indiana tax law.  
Debt service is determined based on each farms starting debt position and amortization schedule. 
Operator withdrawals are also accounted for in the statement of cash flows.  Langemeier and Patrick 
(1990) and Mishra and Morehart (1998) conducted analyses on the marginal propensity to consume 
(MPC) for farmers.  Langemeier and Patrick found MPC rates of approximately 0.14 for Illinois 
farmers and Mishra and Morehart found MPC rates of approximately 0.19 for farmers.  A simple 
average of the two was used to calculate the marginal propensity to consume.  Langemeier and 
Patrick also found cases where household consumption exceeded disposable household income.  For 
cases such as this a minimum withdrawal must be implemented for family subsistence.  The ARMS data provides survey results for the category “Principal operator household income minimum 
deemed necessary.”  This value is used as the minimum household income necessary.  Using any off-
farm income to offset the minimum household income, “minimum operator withdrawals” are 
calculated as “Principal operator household income minimum deemed necessary” minus off-farm 
income.  Therefore, operator withdrawals are calculated as the greater of “minimum operator 
withdrawals” or the MPC multiplied by net farm income.  Finally, cash available after taxes, debt 
servicing, and operator withdrawals is added to the assets on the balance sheet.  Any cash shortfalls 
are remedied by short-term borrowing. 
Balance sheets for each farm type incorporate beginning asset, debt, and owner equity 
values.  These values are updated using the simulated income statement and other cash flow 
information, including operator withdrawals and farm asset growth through equity and debt 
financing.  Year-over-year change in land values incorporate the change due to non-agricultural 
factors as well as capitalized increases (or decreases) attributed to agricultural returns per acre.   
Yield and price data from 1975 to 2004 gathered from the National Agricultural Statistics 
Service (NASS) will be used to simulate yields and prices.  Yields are modeled as a linear time trend.  
Local prices are modeled as an autoregressive moving average (ARMA) process where yields are also 
included as a dependant variable.  Mean price levels are adjusted to the FAPRI baseline projection 
levels, making use of a more refined deterministic projection while allowing for the simulation of 
stochastic variability estimated through error structures from times series models of the historical 
data.  To capture the farm-level yield variability, Carroll County, Indiana yields are simulated as a 
function of Indiana state yields.  Correlation in error terms across commodities is maintained and 
stochastic error processes are developed from the estimated time series models. 
This simulation model simulates a set of 1,000 yield and price realizations each year for 10 
years into the future for corn, soybeans, and wheat.  These yield and price realizations are then used 
in financial statements to analyze net income, total equity, and debt repayment capacity.  Financial 
statements are calibrated to reflect characteristics of a corn, soybean and wheat farm in the eastern Corn Belt, encompassing Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio using the 2003 Agricultural Resource 
Management Survey (ARMS).  All three states were chosen to provide sufficient sample size.  These 
financial statements are used to analyze the long-term effects of reductions in government subsidies.   
Reductions in Subsidy Payments 
Subsidy reduction scenarios have been taken from recommendations by FAPRI.  According 
to FAPRI stochastic simulation results, the proposed changes bring US aggregate measures of 
support into compliance with FAPRI guidelines in no less than 95 percent of occurrences.  These 
reductions consist of 7 percent reductions in target prices and 11 percent reductions in loan rates to 
be implemented from 2007 to 2011.  There are no changes to direct payment rates.  The proposed 
loan rates and target prices can be found in table 1.   
Performance Measures 
  Several performance measures will be used to analyze each of the 11 scenarios.  The 
scenarios will be analyzed for the long-term effects of reductions in government subsidies.  This will 
include a comparison of the key measures before and after the policy reductions in 2012.  The key 
comparisons will be drawn between before and after results in one year as opposed to the changes 
over time in one policy scenario. 
  The key metrics to be compared are net farm income, total equity, and term debt coverage 
ratio.  Net farm income provides a measure of how reductions in subsidy payments affect the annual 
income stream.  Total equity allows for analysis of farm wealth, and term debt coverage ratio will 
indicate if a certain group of farms is more susceptible to default after reductions in subsidies. 
Data 
The data used to populate these financial statements comes from the 2003 Agricultural 
Resource Management Survey (ARMS), the USDA’s “primary source of information about the 
current status and trends in the financial condition, production practices, and resource use of 
America’s farmers” (ERS, 2006).  These surveys are conducted annually in the US and co-sponsored 
by the Economic Research Service (ERS) and the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS).  ARMS summary statistics are made available to the public through the USDA website.  Due to the 
level of specificity, the data contained in this research were obtained with special permission from the 
ERS. 
Summary statistics from the 12 scenarios (including the omitted scenario) and the pooled 
data are contained in table 2.  Briggeman (2006) developed a set of US farm typology cluster groups.  
The seven categories he developed were: single income ruralpolitan, double income ruralpolitan, dual 
career operator and spouse, active seniors, farm operator with spouse working off-farm, traditional, 
and commercial.  The last three typologies were chosen in order to isolate the largest three groups by 
asset size and less dependence on off-farm income.  In addition to grouping farms by typology, they 
were also divided into high and low debt groups and high and low owned-to-operated land ratio 
groups.  The break between high and low debt groups was set with the debt-to-asset ratio at 0.08, the 
median of all 454 observations.  The break between high and low owned-to-operated land ratio 
groups was set at 0.5.  
The Stochastic Processes 
To simulate prices and yields, stochastic processes are estimated based on the residuals from 
estimated time series yield and price models.  A multivariate empirical distribution for the stochastic 
component of each variable is constructed using the residuals from the deterministic model following 
the method outlined by Richardson, Klose, and Gray (2000).   
The final simulated price and yield estimates are contained in Table 4.  The mean, standard 
deviation, 5th percentile, and 95th percentile have been reported for the yield data.  Since 2005 was the 
first simulated year in the model and 2005 yields are already known, they were taken as given in the 
model.  In 2006 the average eastern Corn Belt corn yield is 153.5 bushels/acre with a standard 
deviation of 23.9 bushels/acre.  The mean yield and the standard deviation gradually rise over the 
simulation period of the model.  The mean soybean and wheat yields in 2006 are 46.7 and 67.7 
bushels/acre, respectively.  These mean values as well as standard deviations rise over the simulation 
period. In addition to the mean, standard deviation, 5th percentile, and 95th percentile reported for 
crop prices, the probability of the MYA price being below the effective target price and the 
probability of the average annual PCP being below the loan rate are listed.  This gives an indicator of 
the probability of receiving CCPs and LDPs.  While the probability of the MYA corn price being 
below the effective target price in 2006 is 78.9 percent, it diminishes to 36.2 percent in 2012, the final 
year of payment reductions.  As well, the probability of the average PCP being below the loan rate in 
2006 is 65.7 percent but only 19.3 percent in 2012.  The trend of the declining probabilities over time 
for corn is also present in soybeans and wheat.  This implies that as prices increase, farmers are likely 
receiving less money in subsidies.  The results of the stochastic accounting simulation model are 
discussed next. 
Results
  Net farm income (NFI), total equity, and term debt coverage ratio (TDCR) are tracked as 
the key output variables.  The proposed policy alternative, defined by the Food and Agricultural 
Policy Research Institute, entails a reduction in target prices and loan rates from 2007 to 2011.  The 
key output variables are analyzed both with and without the proposed change in policy.  The results 
are reported for 2012, the first year after the subsidy reductions are fully implemented.  This provides 
a snapshot of the farm’s well financial performance in the long run after the reductions have been 
absorbed.  Each output variable is monitored for the median, standard deviation, and 5th percentile.  
Specific analysis will focus on the median, standard deviation and 5th percentile levels.  In addition, 
the probability that the TDCR is less than one is also reported.  The results are summarized in Tables 
5 through 7. 
Net Farm Income 
  For each of the three typologies, farms with a low owned-to-operated ratio (i.e. low 
ownership) have the highest median NFI in the base case indicating the large size of these 
operations.  The lowest NFI group is low debt/high ownership farms.  The policy change results in 
Median NFI level decreases of between 5.6 and 8.2 percent for each of the 11 scenarios.  Additionally, the standard deviation of NFI increases between 5.3 and 6.3 percent for each of these 
scenarios.  The range in the reduction in the 5th percentile of NFI after 2012 is from 8.6 percent to 
17.7 percent.  The largest percent reduction occurs in traditional farms with low debt/high 
ownership where a 17.7 percent decrease is from $18,577 to $15,283.  The largest absolute decrease 
occurs in commercial high debt/low ownership farms and is from $72,556 to $60,966, a 16 percent 
reduction.  It is of note that the previous two categories, traditional and commercial high debt/low 
ownership farms, are the two largest categories by acres farmed.  The high debt/low ownership 
category for farm operator with spouse working off-farm is the largest absolute reduction in the 5th 
percentile for its typology at $7,216, which represents a 13.2 percent reduction.  The other category 
across typologies that see large percentage decreases in NFI is low debt/high ownership.  This 
category for farm operator with spouse working off-farm and traditional farm types has reductions 
by 17.4 percent.  However these are the smallest two scenarios out of the 11 by acres farmed and 
thus their absolute reductions are much smaller.   
The farm types that have the biggest decrease in downside NFI protection from subsidy 
reductions are farms in the low debt/high ownership and high debt/low ownership categories.  
However the largest absolute reductions occur in the latter high debt/low ownership category, which 
corresponds to being the largest farms.  The reductions in median NFI levels coupled with similar 
percentage increases in standard deviations are indicative of the downside protection afforded by 
current farm policy levels.  Lowering the subsidy levels for LDP’s and CCP’s reduces the skewness in 
the distribution of NFI for all of the farms resulting in a drop in median values and an increase in 
variability.  Without simulating the stochastic nature of prices and yields, the impacts of changes in 
the farm policy instruments on farm level financial performance would be understated.  
Wealth Effects 
  In general, the total wealth of each farm scenario is more closely linked to the owned-to-
operated ratio than to acres operated.  For example, of traditional farms, although low debt/high 
ownership is the smallest by acres operated, it is the largest by net worth.  Therefore, one would expect that reductions in subsidies that cause decreases to land values would cause the largest 
decrease in wealth for farms with high ownership. 
  After full implementation of subsidy reductions the median expected wealth levels for each 
scenario decrease between 0.3 and 1.5 percent and the 5th percentile levels decrease between 0.3 and 
1.4 percent due to subsidy reductions.  Interestingly, the reductions in wealth due to the policy 
change are more severe for the low ownership farms than the high ownership farms.  The standard 
deviation of the wealth level increases between 6.9 and 9.5 percent, and the standard deviation of 
wealth increases by a greater percentage for farms with high ownership compared to farms with low 
ownership.  In every case the percentage reduction in 5th percentile wealth levels is larger for low 
ownership farms compared to high ownership farms.   
Despite having lower equity levels in every case, low ownership farms operate more acres 
and have higher NFI levels than there high ownership counterparts.  In the current structure of the 
simulation model, any cash earnings net of all financial obligations are retained in the business.  
Therefore, years with high NFI will result in higher equity levels.  Because low ownership farms have 
higher levels of NFI, reductions in subsidies will reduce their NFI and thus reduce their increases in 
wealth over time.  This implies that reduced NFI due to lower CCP and LDP subsidies has a greater 
affect on wealth in the long run than decreases in land values. 
Term Debt Repayment Capacity Effects 
  When the TDCR drops below one, a farm’s cash available for debt service is below their 
debt servicing obligations and they may have a difficult time paying this long-term debt.  By tracking 
the probability that the TDCR is below one, it provides insight into the number of farms that have a 
higher probability of defaulting on loans. 
  In each scenario, low debt farms have sufficiently high TDCRs so that any reduction in 
subsidies still maintains that there is zero percent probability that the TDCR of these farms’ will drop 
below one.  While there are small reductions in the TDCR for median and 95th percentile levels for 
low debt farms, each of the reductions does not diminish the TDCR below two in any scenario.  Therefore, it is concluded that for low debt farms, reduced subsidies do not increase the probability 
of facing difficulties in servicing term debts. 
  For all three typologies, high debt/high ownership farms have the lowest median TDCR and 
the highest probability that the TDCR will fall below one.  The median TDCR for high debt/high 
ownership farm operator with spouse working off-farm goes from 1.09 to 1.07 after subsidy 
reductions and the probability that the TDCR falls below one goes from 26 to 30 percent, an 
increase by 4 percentage points.  For the commercial farm typology this probability increases from 
12.0 to 16 percent.  There is no change in the probability of a TDCR below 1 for the traditional farm 
due to a shift in the farms cash flows away from servicing operating debt to servicing term debt when 
government subsidies decline.  With rising projected mean commodity prices between 2007 and 2012 
the probability of TDCR’s below 1 are significantly lower in 2012, however the subsidy reductions 
still cause the median TDCR to decrease for high debt/high ownership farms.   
For farms with low debt, their short-term and long-term ability to service debts is sufficiently 
high that a reduction in subsidy payments causes no impact on their continued ability to service those 
debts.  For farms with high debt/low ownership, with rising simulated mean commodity payments, 
their ability to service debts in the long run is strong and unabated by a reduction in subsidy 
payments.  Finally, high debt/high ownership farms currently represent the highest risk of failure to 
service term debts, and reductions in commodity payments slightly increase the risk of failing to 
service those debts. 
Conclusions
  The results of the analysis show that the impact of the U.S. proposal to the WTO has an 
expected negative impact on farm level financial performance for traditional corn/soybean farms in 
the Midwest.  However, the expected increase in commodity prices projected by FAPRI as a result of 
the policy changes lessens the impact that would otherwise occur.  The main objective of this study 
was to examine how the policy change might impact farms with different size and ownership structures.  The ARMS data was used to define “typical” farms in the Midwest with different mixes 
of owned versus rented land, asset levels, debt positions, and labor allocations.  
  The policy change has the most substantial impact on NFI due to the reduction in the safety 
net provided by CCP’s and LDP’s.  In absolute terms, the biggest downside impact occurs for the 
larger farms with high debt and low ownership.  On a percentage basis the bigger impact is for low 
debt/high ownership traditional farms.  The low debt/high ownership farms have absorptive 
capacity in their financial performance to weather the policy shock due to their low debt positions.  
But, larger farms associated with high debt/low ownership positions are vulnerable to the reduction 
in the safety net and will have increased difficulty repaying debts.   
  One original hypothesis of this work was that high ownership farms would suffer more from 
reductions in equity valuation associated with reductions in land values due to changes in policy.  
However, the fact that land values are only partially determined by farm income lessens the impact 
on farm level wealth due to the policy change.  In addition, the fact that reductions in downside risk 
protection in policy instruments does not translate to the same magnitude of reduction in the 
expected value of farm income; particularly when commodity prices are increasing; the impact of the 
policy change would be more heavily felt in cash flows than in equity values.  Thus, high ownership 
farms, in this analysis, due not face a bigger impact in financial performance compared to their low 
ownership counterparts.  References 
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Table 1. Changes in Farm Policy Instruments 
 
Corn Current 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Loan Rate 1.95 1.95 1.91 1.86 1.82 1.78 1.74 1.74 1.74 1.74
Target Price 2.63 2.63 2.59 2.56 2.52 2.48 2.45 2.45 2.45 2.45
Direct Payment 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28  
 
 
Soybeans Current 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Loan Rate 5.00 5.00 4.89 4.78 4.67 4.56 4.45 4.45 4.45 4.45
Target Price 5.80 5.80 5.72 5.64 5.56 5.48 5.39 5.39 5.39 5.39
Direct Payment 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44  
 
Wheat Current 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Loan Rate 2.75 2.75 2.69 2.63 2.57 2.51 2.45 2.45 2.45 2.45
Target Price 3.92 3.92 3.87 3.81 3.76 3.70 3.65 3.65 3.65 3.65
Direct Payment 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52  Table 2.  Characteristics of Farm Typologies Used in the Analysis 
 
Farm Operator with Spouse Working Off-
farm -- low debt / high ownership 
Debt/Asset Ratio        0.02  
Owned/Operated Ratio        0.85  
Acres         353  
Observations           16  
Off-farm Income     53,916  
     
Gross Cash Income     91,718  
Variable Cash Expenses     52,255  
Fixed Cash Expenses     14,720  
Net Cash Farm Income     24,744  
Net Farm Income     36,204  
     
Total Assets   853,794  
Current Assets     82,144  
Non-current assets   771,649  
Total Liabilities     11,938  
Current Liabilities       3,995  
Non-current Liabilities       5,031  
Farm Equity   841,856  
 
 
Farm Operator with Spouse Working Off-
farm – high debt / high ownership 
Debt/Asset Ratio           0.19  
Owned/Operated Ratio           0.81  
Acres            770  
Observations              14  
Off-farm Income        68,594  
     
Gross Cash Income      288,158  
Variable Cash Expenses      133,367  
Fixed Cash Expenses        81,931  
Net Cash Farm Income        72,861  
Net Farm Income         4,342  
     
Total Assets   2,164,550  
Current Assets      239,977  
Non-current assets   1,924,572  
Total Liabilities      510,906  
Current Liabilities        31,362  
Non-current Liabilities      415,684  





Farm Operator with Spouse Working Off-
farm – low debt / low ownership 
Debt/Asset Ratio        0.03  
Owned/Operated Ratio        0.18  
Acres         873  
Observations           53  
Off-farm Income     48,456  
     
Gross Cash Income   243,034  
Variable Cash Expenses   107,521  
Fixed Cash Expenses     41,343  
Net Cash Farm Income     94,170  
Net Farm Income     81,405  
     
Total Assets   948,147  
Current Assets   172,218  
Non-current assets   775,930  
Total Liabilities     30,111  
Current Liabilities       5,283  
Non-current Liabilities     13,886  
Farm Equity   918,036  
 
 
Farm Operator with Spouse Working Off-
farm – high debt / low ownership 
Debt/Asset Ratio           0.26  
Owned/Operated Ratio           0.15  
Acres         1,101  
Observations              90  
Off-farm Income        49,901  
     
Gross Cash Income      313,119  
Variable Cash Expenses      142,676  
Fixed Cash Expenses        92,288  
Net Cash Farm Income        78,155  
Net Farm Income        80,225  
     
Total Assets   1,086,862  
Current Assets      186,743  
Non-current assets      900,119  
Total Liabilities      259,951  
Current Liabilities        55,227  
Non-current Liabilities      156,923  
Farm Equity      826,911  
 
 Table 2. (Continued) 
 
Commercial Farms – low debt / high 
ownership 
Debt/Asset Ratio           0.02  
Owned/Operated Ratio           0.93  
Acres            644  
Observations                6  
Off-farm Income        25,259  
     
Gross Cash Income      137,750  
Variable Cash Expenses      121,790  
Fixed Cash Expenses        28,530  
Net Cash Farm Income       (12,570) 
Net Farm Income        65,926  
     
Total Assets   1,431,786  
Current Assets      223,423  
Non-current assets   1,208,363  
Total Liabilities        41,283  
Current Liabilities         4,131  
Non-current Liabilities        29,041  
Farm Equity   1,390,503  
 
 
Commercial Farms – high debt / high 
ownership 
Debt/Asset Ratio           0.24  
Owned/Operated Ratio           0.84  
Acres            865  
Observations              14  
Off-farm Income        60,411  
     
Gross Cash Income      264,097  
Variable Cash Expenses      123,833  
Fixed Cash Expenses        66,956  
Net Cash Farm Income        73,308  
Net Farm Income        47,844  
     
Total Assets   2,453,146  
Current Assets      109,133  
Non-current assets   2,344,013  
Total Liabilities      557,560  
Current Liabilities        37,026  
Non-current Liabilities      446,262  






Commercial Farms – low debt / low 
ownership 
Debt/Asset Ratio           0.04  
Owned/Operated Ratio           0.16  
Acres         1,110  
Observations              26  
Off-farm Income        12,967  
     
Gross Cash Income      332,583  
Variable Cash Expenses      137,327  
Fixed Cash Expenses        73,686  
Net Cash Farm Income      121,569  
Net Farm Income        79,485  
     
Total Assets   1,143,778  
Current Assets      218,320  
Non-current assets      925,457  
Total Liabilities        50,308  
Current Liabilities         6,817  
Non-current Liabilities        25,318  
Farm Equity   1,093,470  
 
 
Commercial Farms – high debt / low 
ownership 
Debt/Asset Ratio           0.25  
Owned/Operated Ratio           0.16  
Acres         1,553  
Observations              52  
Off-farm Income        36,867  
     
Gross Cash Income      465,186  
Variable Cash Expenses      234,180  
Fixed Cash Expenses      135,475  
Net Cash Farm Income        95,531  
Net Farm Income        74,406  
     
Total Assets   1,605,811  
Current Assets      282,431  
Non-current assets   1,323,380  
Total Liabilities      341,190  
Current Liabilities        61,078  
Non-current Liabilities      215,565  
Farm Equity   1,264,621  
 
 Table 2. (Continued) 
 
Traditional Farms – low debt / high 
ownership 
Debt/Asset Ratio           0.01  
Owned/Operated Ratio           0.78  
Acres            489  
Observations              45  
Off-farm Income        25,857  
     
Gross Cash Income      123,392  
Variable Cash Expenses        68,070  
Fixed Cash Expenses        23,771  
Net Cash Farm Income        31,551  
Net Farm Income         9,825  
     
Total Assets   2,155,903  
Current Assets      147,968  
Non-current assets   2,007,935  
Total Liabilities        25,624  
Current Liabilities         5,078  
Non-current Liabilities        14,759  
Farm Equity   2,130,279  
 
 
Traditional Farms – high debt / high 
ownership 
Debt/Asset Ratio           0.20  
Owned/Operated Ratio           0.80  
Acres            769  
Observations              28  
Off-farm Income        35,642  
     
Gross Cash Income      235,914  
Variable Cash Expenses      107,797  
Fixed Cash Expenses        59,250  
Net Cash Farm Income        68,867  
Net Farm Income        51,854  
     
Total Assets   1,910,824  
Current Assets      188,895  
Non-current assets   1,721,929  
Total Liabilities      386,714  
Current Liabilities        53,832  
Non-current Liabilities      282,042  






Traditional Farms – low debt / low 
ownership 
Debt/Asset Ratio           0.03  
Owned/Operated Ratio           0.24  
Acres         1,161  
Observations              41  
Off-farm Income        30,577  
     
Gross Cash Income      341,326  
Variable Cash Expenses      146,774  
Fixed Cash Expenses        68,658  
Net Cash Farm Income      125,894  
Net Farm Income      111,256  
     
Total Assets   1,796,396  
Current Assets      273,326  
Non-current assets   1,523,069  
Total Liabilities        53,161  
Current Liabilities        22,600  
Non-current Liabilities        13,738  
Farm Equity   1,743,234  
 
 
Traditional Farms – high debt / low 
ownership 
Debt/Asset Ratio           0.20  
Owned/Operated Ratio           0.26  
Acres         1,195  
Observations              69  
Off-farm Income        19,742  
     
Gross Cash Income      332,334  
Variable Cash Expenses      149,187  
Fixed Cash Expenses      106,848  
Net Cash Farm Income        76,299  
Net Farm Income        89,398  
     
Total Assets   1,592,819  
Current Assets      212,411  
Non-current assets   1,380,408  
Total Liabilities      318,232  
Current Liabilities        40,199  
Non-current Liabilities      225,420  
Farm Equity   1,274,587  Table 3. Simulation results for Yields 
 
Corn 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Mean 146.0        153.5        155.2        157.0        158.7        160.5        162.3        164.1        165.8        167.6       
St. Dev. 23.9          24.2          24.3          24.3          24.6          25.1          25.6          25.3          25.7         
5th Percentile 104.3        106.6        106.3        107.7        109.5        109.4        112.0        113.6        114.7       
95th Percentile 186.9        190.8        193.5        193.1        198.0        198.1        200.7        202.2        203.0         
 
Soybeans 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Mean 47.1          46.7          47.2          47.7          48.1          48.6          49.1          49.6          50.1          50.6         
St. Dev. 5.8            5.8            5.9            5.9            6.0            5.9            6.0            6.0            6.1           
5th Percentile 36.2          36.5          36.8          37.6          38.4          38.7          38.8          39.8          39.6         
95th Percentile 55.4          55.6          56.5          56.8          58.0          57.9          58.9          59.1          59.6           
 
Wheat  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Mean 67.8          67.7          68.7          69.7          70.7          71.6          72.6          73.6          74.6          75.5         
St. Dev. 10.8          11.0          11.3          11.4          11.3          11.4          11.6          11.8          11.9         
5th Percentile 48.0          48.3          49.7          50.7          50.8          52.1          52.0          52.9          52.7         










 Table 4. Simulation Results for Prices 
 
Corn 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Mean 1.80          2.12          2.24          2.34          2.43          2.48          2.50          2.51          2.52          2.53         
St. Dev. 0.34          0.35          0.35          0.36          0.36          0.37          0.36          0.37          0.36         
5th Percentile 1.62          1.71          1.82          1.87          1.94          1.97          1.96          2.00          1.99         
95th Percentile 2.75          2.86          2.93          3.06          3.10          3.21          3.16          3.21          3.19         
Prob. MYA < 2.35 100.0% 78.9% 67.1% 55.8% 44.9% 37.0% 36.8% 36.2% 34.2% 32.9%
Avg. PCP 1.54          1.86          1.98          2.08          2.17          2.22          2.24          2.25          2.26          2.27         
Prob. Avg. PCP < 1.95 100.0% 65.7% 50.1% 35.5% 27.5% 21.7% 19.8% 19.3% 19.5% 17.4%  
 
Soybeans
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Mean 5.50          5.05          5.33          5.53          5.56          5.60          5.66          5.67          5.66          5.64         
St. Dev. 0.86          0.84          0.83          0.83          0.82          0.84          0.82          0.84          0.81         
5th Percentile 3.79          4.07          4.23          4.35          4.34          4.44          4.38          4.44          4.42         
95th Percentile 6.53          6.81          7.01          7.04          7.06          7.18          7.11          7.10          7.02         
Prob. MYA < 5.36 0.0% 63.5% 53.6% 43.7% 44.2% 40.6% 39.8% 36.6% 38.6% 39.5%
Avg. PCP 5.16          4.71          4.99          5.19          5.22          5.26          5.32          5.33          5.32          5.30         
Prob. Avg. PCP < 5.00 0.0% 63.0% 52.5% 42.5% 43.3% 40.0% 39.1% 35.7% 37.8% 38.6%  
 
Wheat
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Mean 3.15          3.11          3.20          3.26          3.36          3.41          3.47          3.50          3.53          3.56         
St. Dev. 0.39          0.46          0.45          0.51          0.52          0.52          0.53          0.53          0.53         
5th Percentile 2.40          2.43          2.50          2.55          2.52          2.63          2.68          2.68          2.71         
95th Percentile 3.73          3.92          3.97          4.22          4.29          4.37          4.36          4.46          4.48         
Prob. MYA < 3.40 100.0% 76.7% 63.8% 62.4% 54.2% 48.6% 45.4% 44.7% 40.6% 39.7%
Avg. PCP 2.99          49.11        49.60        50.07        50.57        1.54          1.86          1.98          2.08          2.17         
Prob. Avg. PCP < 2.75 0.0% 28.6% 29.9% 23.5% 20.2% 17.3% 16.6% 14.7% 12.7% 11.1%  Table 5. Impact of Alternative Farm Policy on the Farm Operator with Spouse Working Off The Farm Household Type 
Base Alternative % Change Base Alternative % Change Base Alternative % Change Base Alternative % Change
Farm Income
Median 107,834       101,775         -5.62% 27,903         25,773         -7.63% 106,520       98,774           -7.27% 75,959         70,781           -6.82%
Standard Deviation 27,020         28,564           5.71% 9,826           10,392         5.76% 33,979         35,829           5.44% 22,656         23,890           5.45%
5th Percentile 66,926         60,895           -9.01% 13,181         10,885         -17.42% 54,600         47,383           -13.22% 41,477         36,521           -11.95%
Wealth
Median 1,415,397    1,400,797      -1.03% 1,036,976    1,030,655    -0.61% 1,304,490    1,285,967      -1.42% 2,270,096    2,258,861      -0.49%
Standard Deviation 50,562         54,379           7.55% 23,420         25,649         9.52% 62,583         66,911           6.92% 60,743         65,767           8.27%
5th Percentile 1,339,275    1,321,564      -1.32% 1,001,547    992,530       -0.90% 1,212,112    1,191,306      -1.72% 2,188,340    2,165,964      -1.02%
Repayment Capacity
Median 3.65             3.54              -3.01% 4.40             4.21             -4.32% 5.22             4.98              -4.60% 1.09             1.07              -1.83%
Standard Deviation 0.47             0.49              4.26% 0.71             0.76             7.04% 0.99             1.02              3.03% 0.16             0.15              -6.25%
5th Percentile 2.95             2.84              -3.73% 3.30             3.11             -5.76% 3.79             3.58              -5.54% 0.82             0.84              2.44%
Probability of < 1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 26% 30% 4%
Low Debt/Low Ownership Low Debt/High Ownership High Debt/Low Ownership High Debt/High Ownership
 Table 6. Impact of Alternative Farm Policy on the Traditional Farm Household Type 
Base Alternative % Change Base Alternative % Change Base Alternative % Change Base Alternative % Change
Farm Income
Median 110,100       103,919         -5.61% 38,943         35,822         -8.01% 105,107       97,117           -7.60% 105,655       99,613           -5.72%
Standard Deviation 27,113         28,685           5.80% 13,719         14,508         5.75% 35,874         37,843           5.49% 24,832         26,321           6.00%
5th Percentile 69,528         63,300           -8.96% 18,577         15,283         -17.73% 51,452         43,337           -15.77% 67,651         61,836           -8.60%
Wealth
Median 1,404,473    1,390,398      -1.00% 2,558,805    2,550,238    -0.33% 1,770,835    1,754,029      -0.95% 2,544,471    2,529,935      -0.57%
Standard Deviation 49,383         52,928           7.18% 34,386         37,703         9.65% 66,982         71,740           7.10% 53,015         57,545           8.54%
5th Percentile 1,330,069    1,312,307      -1.34% 2,508,135    2,494,933    -0.53% 1,671,198    1,648,063      -1.38% 2,467,967    2,446,804      -0.86%
Repayment Capacity
Median 3.59             3.47              -3.34% 2.94             2.98             1.36% 1.89             1.80              -4.76% 1.17             1.16              -0.85%
Standard Deviation 0.55             0.56              1.82% 0.39             0.41             5.13% 0.35             0.36              2.86% 0.23             0.21              -8.70%
5th Percentile 2.33             2.22              -4.72% 2.33             2.22             -4.72% 1.40             1.33              -5.00% 0.79             0.82              3.80%
Probability of < 1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 22% 22% 0%
Low Debt/Low Ownership Low Debt/High Ownership High Debt/Low Ownership High Debt/High Ownership
 Table 7. Impact of Alternative Farm Policy on the Commercial Farm Household Type 
Base Alternative % Change Base Alternative % Change Base Alternative % Change
Farm Income
Median 130,879       123,210         -5.86% 144,093       133,440         -7.39% 104,364       98,232           -5.88%
Standard Deviation 34,506         36,677           6.29% 47,623         50,191           5.39% 24,781         26,254           5.94%
5th Percentile 77,286         68,463           -11.42% 72,556         60,966           -15.97% 66,404         60,661           -8.65%
Wealth
Median 1,683,440    1,663,628      -1.18% 1,972,081    1,943,986      -1.42% 2,633,671    2,619,686      -0.53%
Standard Deviation 71,310         76,974           7.94% 95,390         102,174         7.11% 66,858         72,849           8.96%
5th Percentile 1,574,283    1,546,814      -1.74% 1,827,251    1,795,393      -1.74% 2,543,311    2,515,019      -1.11%
Repayment Capacity
Median 4.10             3.96              -3.41% 4.68             4.46              -4.70% 1.22             1.19              -2.46%
Standard Deviation 0.67             0.69              2.99% 0.97             1.01              4.12% 0.20             0.19              -5.00%
5th Percentile 3.14             2.93              -6.69% 3.38             3.15              -6.80% 0.88             0.89              1.14%
Probability of < 1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 12% 16% 4%
Low Debt/Low Ownership High Debt/Low Ownership High Debt/High Ownership
 